| I. | Drift, 1975-1981 |
| II. | The Reagan Revolution: A New Direction At Home? |
| III. | The Reagan Revolution: A new Direction Abroad? |
(ii) that America's problems can be solved by the application of governmental power: Americans' distrust of politicians and government officials grew dramatically in the years following 1975. Further, they came to believe that government efforts to solve social problems not only fail but often are worse than the disease. For these reasons, the electorate came to endorse the position stated most succinctly by Ronald Reagan, who in his first Inaugural Address (1981) declared that "government is not the e solution to the problem. Government is the problem."
(iii) that America is a nation devoted to fostering greater equality for its people, despite differences in race, sex, ethnicity, religion, culture, or sexual orientation: The effort to realize the nation's commitment to equality at first continued in the late 1970s, as government developed affirmative action policies to provide remedies for past discrimination against members of minority groups. But more and more Americans viewed affirmative action as "reverse discrimination" favoring certain individuals based on race, and thus against other (white male) individuals based on race, even as the Supreme Court struggled to sort out which affirmative action policies were consistent with the Constitution and which were not.
(b) The drive to extend the protection of the Constitution to the right of privacy, including the right of private decision-making in matters of sex and procreation, reached its constitutional high-water-mark in 1973, the year the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, which extended the constitutional right of sexual privacy to cover a woman's choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion. (Although Roe v. Wade might seem more properly to belong in Unit XI, it became controversial only once the American people began to focus on it after the passing of the twin traumas of Watergate and Vietnam.) Roe v. Wade galvanized conservative and right-wing groups who maintained that abortion was murder, and rejected on that basis any possibility that a pregnant woman should have the right to choose whether to continue her pregnancy or not. The conflict over abortion grew beyond anything that pro-choice or pro-life factions expected, to become a dominant issue of American public life -- although one that, to this day, still has not achieved a definitive resolution one way or the other.
To be sure, the "melting pot" ideology that had dominated American thinking on immigration and cultural identity was vulnerable to sharp and justified criticism. It both embodied and symbolized pressure to conform to some hypothetical standard of "Americanization" -- pressure that caused many immigrants to abandon their cultural, religious, and ethnic heritage; forget or scrap their native tongues; and change their names -- and even their appearances -- to win acceptance from the "majority." Moreover, those immigrants who did not jettison their entire cultural identity found themselves living double lives -- living as "Americans" in the world outside the home and in the culture of their birth within the home.
Nonetheless, despite its many flaws and the extensive human damage attributable to it, the idea of the "melting pot" did carry with it one valuable principle worth salvaging from the wreck -- that all Americans, of whatever race, creed, ethnicity, or culture, were of right citizens of the United States with a common political and constitutional heritage. The growing fragmentation of the American people endangers this principle, and this continuing challenge to the idea that Americans of whatever race, religion, ethnicity, or sex nonetheless have common interests as Americans in many ways is the most serious trial the nation faces.
The growing splintering of the American people into groups has fostered, in turn, a growing insistence by many of those groups on redefining the Americans' "shared" or "common" heritage. On the right are ranged advocates of "traditional" core curricula, which they claim are the only dependable backbone of a sound educational system. On the left are ranged advocates of "multicultural" curricula, which they argue redress the imbalance of "traditional" curricula in favor of dead white males of European descent. But this contest is also a battle over the values animating education -- "traditional" values (often closely linked to conservative and fundamentalist religion) versus an emphasis on diversity of religious beliefs and moral values and on a "realistic" approach to the kinds of values and behaviors that schools should foster in their students.
(v) Still other interests and distinctions divide the American people as well:
(b) The aging of America: Census results also confirm that, as the massive bulge in the population representing the so-called "baby boom" (those Americans born between 1946 and 1962) ages, more and more Americans will be dependent on the Social Security system, which will be funded by taxes paid by fewer and fewer Americans -- members of the "baby bust" (those born in the 1960s and early 1970s) and the "second baby boom" (children of the "baby boom" generation, born in the late 1970s and 1980s). Not only will this major age shift affect the Social Security system; it also will pose important challenges to the nation's public and private systems for providing and paying for health care.
(c) The health care crisis: The national crisis over affordable and available health care goes beyond concerns derived from the aging of America. The sheer expense of health costs and the alarming growth in the number of Americans lacking even basic health insurance have surfaced periodically in debates over American health policy. For more than three decades, the growing recognition of cancer as a major killer of Americans has spurred efforts to find a cure -- with only partial success and an uncertain future. Still another issue that drives public debate about health care is the spread of AIDS, a sexually-transmitted disease that, to date, is invariably fatal and at this writing has no cure.
(d) The environmental crisis: The plight of the environment was first brought to public attention in the early 1960s by Rachel Carson's landmark book Silent Spring (1962); it first captured widespread interest in 1970, with the first "Earth Day." Although the modern environmental movement tapped into a long and honorable tradition of "stewardship" thinking about the environment (going back to the Progressive era's Ballinger-Pinchot controversy), it scored its principal successes in the 1970s, with the adoption of environmental legislation and the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency. It also set out, with less success, to educate Americans about their nation's status as the world's leading consumer of natural resources and raw materials and to encourage conservation, recycling, and a less expansive way of life. In the 1980s, however, environmentalism came under sustained attack, on a variety of grounds, from the right wing of American politics. Critics of environmentalism dismissed environmentalists' warnings against global warming, air and water pollution, toxic waste dumps, the destruction of forests, the wholesale extinction of animal and plant life, and the deterioration of the earth's ozone layer as alarmist, anti-business, and a anti-human. This debate still rages, as the nation tries to come to terms with its obligations to its people and to the rest of the world.
(e) The human costs of an ailing economy:
(1) Homelessness in the 1980s and 1990s became an increasingly visible national problem, on a scale rivaling the era of the Great Depression. Traceable to, among other factors, the movement in the 1970s to deinstitutionalize many mental patients, the growing dearth of affordable housing, and the ordinary American's increasingly precarious economic health, homelessness cannot be dismissed any longer as a "phony" national problem.
(2) Substance abuse, for most of the nation's history ignored because it tended to affect only the inner cities (and because alcoholism and smoking were not considered part of the problem until the last twenty years), spread throughout the nation -- a reaction, in part, to the gutting of the economy in many regions. The collapse of industries in the "rust belt" of New England and the Middle West, and the apparently quick and easy money to be made in drug trafficking, have combined to make drug abuse one of the principal problems afflicting American society -- despite nearly three decades of sustained federal, state, and local efforts to combat traffic in dangerous drugs.
(3) Violent crime- of which drug traffic is only one instance -- continued to preoccupy Americans, and to provide a focus for political argument. Two camps emerged to debate the crime problem with growing acrimony but little progress to any sort of solution: One group, based mainly along the right wing of the political spectrum, maintained that government should "get tough" with criminals, concentrating on apprehending those who commit crime and punishing them more severely (including an expanded use of the death penalty). The other, occupying mostly the left wing, argued that crime was a phenomenon whose roots could be traced to larger social ills; they maintained that the most effective response to crime would be to combat homelessness, unemployment, and other social problems, and to control individual citizens' access to firearms, rather than "locking criminals up."
One of the principal reasons for the American people's growing disenchantment with, and distrust of, politics and politicians is the growing inability and unwillingness of all too many politicians, of whatever party or point of view, to come to grips with the problems that alarm Americans most. Ironically, one of the principal reasons for American politicians' failure to confront national problems is their astute perception that most Americans either do not want to face the details of those problems, the hard work needed to devise solutions, and the necessity of accepting social costs as the price of those solutions.
At home, Reagan reversed half a century of American political assumptions. For the first time since before the New Deal, a President persuaded Americans that activist government was not the way to solve the nation's problems -- rather, as he declared in his 1981 inaugural address, government was the problem. Reagan set out to slash the size of the federal government, targeting some agencies (even Cabinet departments, such as Education and Energy) for abolition and others for radical reduction. Although he failed in these sweeping goals, he managed for eight years to appoint officials to run those departments who shared his hostility to their agencies' mandates and missions, and who managed to administer many of those agencies into ineffectiveness in achieving their statutory mandates.
Reagan's great goal was to slash taxes and cut governmental regulation of the economy in order to release the productive energies of the American people. He confidently maintained that cutting taxes would enable Americans to invest in new economic enterprises, causing the economy to grow dramatically and creating thousands of jobs or even more, thus re-employing many Americans who had lost their jobs due to the recession of the 1970s. He also insisted that excessive governmental regulation absorbed the same energies that should be diverted into investment in economic growth.
"Reaganomics" never worked in practice as well as it sounded in theory -- neither its tax-cutting nor its deregulating goals came to fruition.
The other component of the Reagan Revolution at home was the President's vigorous insistence on traditional values. Appointing federal judges and executive-branch officials who shared his conservative agenda, Reagan and his allies hoped to reverse government domestic policy on all fronts -- withdrawing the federal government from providing social services, stripping the federal government of its authority or commitment to enforcing constitutional rights, eliminating legal services for the poor, and so forth. Although the actual achievement of these goals was fragmentary, Reagan managed to reverse the general public's thinking on most major domestic issues.
Emblematic of the Reagan Revolution's emphasis on traditional values was the Administration's campaign to name to the federal bench right-wing judges who would reaffirm traditional values and roll back Supreme Court precedents (such as Miranda v. Arizona [1966], on the rights of criminal suspects and defendants; Griswold v. Connecticut [1963], recognizing a constitutional right of privacy in sexual matters even though the text of the Constitution did not provide specific authorization for it; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke [1978], the pivotal decision on affirmative action; and, above all, Roe v. Wade [1973], the decision that extended constitutional privacy to protect a woman's decision whether or not to have an abortion). At first, the Reagan judicial appointments sailed through the Senate (dominated by Republicans, for the first time in more than three decades, from January 1981 through January 1987) with at best token opposition from demoralized Democrats. In 1987, the retirement of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., gave the Reagan Administration the chance to redirect the Supreme Court decisively. But Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork, a former Yale law professor and a leading right-wing critic of activist liberal Court decisions, provoked a firestorm of opposition and criticism. The televised hearings on Bork's nomination, combined with a vigorous (and occasionally unfair) media campaign against Bork organized by liberal activists, doomed the nomination. In many ways, the Bork defeat spelled the end of Reagan's attempts to put traditional values at the core of the nation's public and private life.
The great difficulty that Reagan and his Administration faced was congressional skepticism of and opposition to Administration foreign policy. Determined to conduct foreign and defense policy despite this resistance from a coordinate branch of government, Reagan and his aides sidestepped legal and even constitutional limitations, arguing for an expansive interpretation of executive authority in defense and foreign policy. The unraveling in late 1986 and 1987 of the Iran-contra affair derailed the Reagan Presidency, and Reagan and his allies managed to regain their balance only through exploring new initiatives offered by the reformist leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. In sum, Reagan's foreign policy was a melange of angry rhetoric, haphazard decisionmaking, and unfulfilled goals. His rapprochement with Gorbachev epitomized the condition of his foreign policy, for he embraced in 1987 the leader of the nation he so fiercely denounced five years before as "the evil empire."
It was in the Bush years that the failure of Reaganomics became apparent. Skyrocketing deficits were exacerbated by the blossoming of the S&L crisis and a shaky economy that never recovered from the stock market crash of 1987. Bush's attempts to solve the deficit problem by a one-time increase of taxes violated his single most famous campaign promise, damaged his credibility, and divided his own party.
Further, the collapse of European Communism left the man who had trained all his adult life to be a Cold War President without any clear sense of what the post-Cold War world should be. President Bush showed great skill in organizing, and in rallying public support for, military ventures in Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf (1991); his popularity ratings soared after each of these operations, but he could not translate them into domestic-policy initiatives or successes.
The 1980s witnessed an all-but-official decision to ignore problems of race and poverty in America, or at best to commit these problems to the tender mercies of the free market. Devastating riots such as those in New York City (1991) and Los Angeles (19 92) suggested that the problems had not gone away, but had festered in obscurity until they exploded on the public scene.
In sum, the Bush years were a period of drift like the Ford and Carter years. Americans therefore sought a President who promised to provide the certainty in defining issues and policies responding to them and the decisiveness in giving those policies effect that they associated with admired Presidents of the past -- Lincoln, FDR, Harry Truman, JFK, and (paradoxically) Reagan.
George Bush was not that President. His opponents in 1992, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton (the Democratic nominee) and H. Ross Perot, a self-created independent candidate, skillfully pilloried Bush as ineffective, out of touch, and unresponsive to the serious problems the nation faced. The question the electorate faced was whether either Clinton or Perot could take up the challenge that Bush could not meet. The voters chose Clinton, in large part because they disdained Bush and distrusted Perot because he could not or would not step beyond his folksy anatomizations of the problems the nation faced to provide detailed accounts of his proposed solutions. By contrast, Clinton and his running mate, Tennessee Senator Al Gore, Jr., ran the best Democratic presidential campaign in living memory. Clinton presented himself as a skilled politician with a firm grasp of the nation's problems and the ability to devise and enact solutions to those problems.
Throughout 1992, politicians and citizens alike called repeatedly for sweeping amendments to the Constitution -- to respond to the growing budget deficit by requiring a balanced budget, to curb the powers of incumbents by limiting congressional terms of office, to ban abortion, and to restore prayer to the public schools. Demands surfaced, for the first time in a generation, for a second constitutional convention. The election of Clinton stilled these demands -- but the respite might well be brief. As President Clinton took office, he seemed to represent a last chance for normal politics; should he fail in his efforts to provide solutions to the nation's problems, the demand for sweeping constitutional change might well resurface.